Sunday, 9 March 2014

Why is the quality of US elections ranked 26th out of 73 contests worldwide?

Pippa Norris

New evidence from the Perceptions of Electoral Integrity (PEI) index highlights the quality of elections. The expert survey provides a standardized way to compare 73 elections held around the globe from 1 July 2012 to 31 December 2013. One of the most striking observations is another example of American exceptionalism - unlike most Western democracies, the United States ranked exceptionally poorly - 26th worldwide, similar to countries such as Mexico and Mongolia. By contrast, countries such as Norway, Germany, the Netherlands, and Austria were all ranked in the top ten.

What explains this rating? The results suggest that the United States suffers from several fundamental flaws of electoral governance and voting administration, and a complex series of partial policy reforms which have sought to address concern. Problems in electoral administration were exemplified most dramatically by Bush v. Gore in Florida in 2000; since then several new initiatives, notably the 2002 Help America Vote Act (HAVA), have sought to ensure that every eligible citizen can register and that every vote will be counted accurately.[i] Yet many deep-rooted structural problems have not been tackled, indeed some have probably worsened since Florida as issues of electoral rights and voter fraud have become increasingly partisan, litigious, and contentious during the last decade.[ii]

Estimates about the quality of the 2012 US election are illustrated in Figure 1, showing the evaluations provided by experts in the Perceptions of Electoral Integrity survey. For comparison, the figure also includes estimates for the Netherlands, selected as another long-established democracy but one with a far more positive rating. As the radar-gram shows, across nearly all dimensions, the United States consistently scores less well than the Netherlands, with the exception of media coverage and party and candidate registration. The evaluations of the Unites States is particularly critical in terms of electoral laws, redistricting, and voter registration procedures, all reflecting contemporary controversies and partisan divides in American politics.  Campaign finance regulations were another weak area, although here the gap between the countries was less marked. 
Source: Electoral Integrity Project. 2013. the expert survey or perceptions of electoral integrity, PEI2. www.electoralintegrityproject.com

What has contributed towards this performance? Most democracies have established an independent national election management body, accountable to the legislature, with primary responsibility for registering citizens and managing the electoral process.[iii]   In America, however, electoral administration remains highly decentralized, fragmented, partisan, and often under-resourced. The Federal Election Commission’s role is limited to making campaign finance contributions and spending more transparent, and in this regard they do a fine job, although transparency per se does not necessarily lead to greater accountability. The Electoral Assistance Commission was created under the Help America Vote Act (HAVA) in 2002 as a new federal agency tasked with overseeing and monitoring certain minimum standards of electoral administration, but primary responsibility for conducting elections is specified in the US constitution as a state-level responsibility.[iv] The 2000 Florida contest in Gore v. Bush spurred changes in voting technologies and voter registration laws, but the effectiveness of these developments has been patchy. Little attention has been paid to the ground troops manning the local polling places, although the quality of American elections rests ultimately in the hands of partisan local officials, “frequently ill-equipped, poorly trained, part-time administrators”, and paid day-volunteer poll workers.[v] 

U.S. citizens are required to mail their registration form to counties, cities and townships, in most places usually well ahead of polling day. One in four eligible electors — at least 51 million Americans—fail to do so.  Complex rules and deadlines for registering vary across states, as do facilities for early and absentee voting.[vi] Despite the e-governance revolution, citizens resident in the United States continue to submit hand-written registration forms, vulnerable to problems of legibility, missing information and processing errors.[vii] Party activists and voluntary organizations handle, collect and submit bundles of forms, as do officials of the Registry of Motor Vehicles. The official forms also collect information on party affiliations, released as part of the public record, a potential violation of basic rights to confidentiality. The Pew Center estimates that about 24 million names on the electoral register are invalid or inaccurate.[viii] This includes about 1.8 million dead and some 2.8 million who have duplicate registrations in more than one state.  The Pew report suggests that about 12 million registrations have errors serious enough to make it unlikely that citizens can be contacted by mail. In addition, some 3.3 million Americans with felony convictions remain disenfranchised, in some states for life, due to prohibitive legal regulations or burdensome procedures for reinstating voting rights.[ix]  Another 4.1 million citizens resident in US territories such as the US Virgin Islands, Guam and Puerto Rico are ineligible to vote in presidential elections.

Far from making citizen participation easier, during the last decade many American states have passed laws requiring voters to show photo identification at polls, cutting back early voting periods, or imposing new restrictions on voter registration drives. In mid-2012, legislation of voter ID requirements is pending in around two thirds of all US states, including new voter ID proposals in fourteen states, proposals to strengthen existing voter ID laws in ten states, and bills in nine states to amend the new voter ID laws passed in 2011.[x] It is estimated that the effect of implementing these requirements in several key states depressed turnout in the Obama v. Romney contests by around one to two percent.[xi]  Republican legislators claim that the new rules preserve the integrity of the ballot box. Democrats argue that the changes discourage turnout, especially among minorities and young people. Overall the immense hoopla about potential fraud in U.S. elections seems largely manufactured rhetoric; a study analyzing criminal cases and prosecution statistics from 2000-2005 concluded that, according to this evidence, actual cases of election fraud explicitly intended to affect the outcome of a federal election are almost nonexistent.[xii] Another detailed account arrived at similar findings: although millions of Americans cast ballots, almost no one knowingly and willfully casts an illegal vote today, so that voter fraud is a ‘politically constructed myth’.[xiii] Where restrictive voter identification requirements generate a systematic suppression of disproportionately Democratic voters, including the poor, African American and Hispanics, then this also goes beyond maladministration to raise fundamental questions about the violation of human rights.

The problems of maladministration at the ballot box are substantial; however they pale into insignificance compared with challenges caused by the pervasive role of money in American politics.  Spending is unlimited during the long campaign; in the 2008 Obama v. McCain campaign, for example, over $1.7 billion dollars was raised by all the presidential candidates, a ten-fold increase since Carter v. Ford in 1976.[xiv] The 2012 electoral cycle is estimated to have cost more than $6 billion in total, the most expensive elections yet.[xv] The total costs during presidential electoral cycles has risen steadily from 2000 to 2012 by around one billion per cycle, far more than the cumulative rate of inflation. [xvi]  Financial donations to candidates and parties are monitored and regulated by the Federal Election Commission. Following the Supreme Court’s decision in Citizens United vs. FEC in January 2010, however, individuals, corporations and unions can make unlimited donations to independent super PACs supporting particular candidates. Citizens United has reinforced concerns about fairness and equity although in the United States, unrestricted campaign spending is equated with the right to free speech and others defend unlimited contributions. [xvii] Spending by outside groups aligned in support of a specific presidential candidate is estimated to have more than doubled during the 2012 primary and pre-convention period, compared with the equivalent months during the previous presidential contest.[xviii] Inequalities in financial resources can reinforce, in turn, imbalanced media coverage, both through the capacity to purchase paid TV spots and also through reporters’ assessments of candidate credibility during the early stages of primary races.[xix] There are also many residual issues which recur concerning the accuracy and security of the final vote counting process, due to voting machines. State laws governing candidate ballot access are also usually highly restrictive for third party challengers, while the manufactured majority in the Electoral College used in presidential contests penalizes third parties which fail to gain a popular plurality of the vote in every state.[xx] 

Partisan gerrymandering by state legislatures is the norm for redistricting, reducing the number of competitive districts, in contrast to many other democracies which use more impartial judicial or independent electoral or boundary commissions.[xxi] The consequences of partisan gerrymandering have caused concern because of the potential consequences of this policy in exacerbating polarized partisan politics. In particular, during the October 2013 budget stalemate in Congress, a relatively small number of members of the House of Representatives proved intransigent by shutting down the federal government and budget negotiations for three weeks in an abortive attempt to de-fund the Affordable Care Act (Obamacare).[xxii]  Although ultimately defeated, the effort proved highly damaging for confidence in the American economy and for the U.S.’s international credit rating. One factor contributing towards the rise of Tea Party members has been partisan gerrymandering, allowing Republican-dominated states to draw ultra-safe boundaries which safeguard conservative members and which thereby weaken the electoral incentives for representatives to make broader appeals likely to win support across a broader and more diverse range of constituents.[xxiii] Gerrymandered house districts are not necessarily a fundamental cause for the rise of the Tea Party, which reflects the success of the radical right parties and discontent with more centrist parties found in many other established democracies, but partisan redistricting can be a facilitating condition, by limiting the traditionally moderating effects of majoritarian electoral systems.

In short, American elections continue to face major challenges when administering accurate and fair voter registration and vote counting processes, as well as facing broader structural problems concerning the regulation of campaign funding, ballot access, and redistricting. The Presidential Commission on Electoral Administration, appointed by President Obama in May 2013, was established to examine bipartisan ways to shorten lines at polling places, promote the efficient conduct of elections, and provide better access to the polls for all voters. [xxiv] But the Commission is not designed to address the more deep-rooted and enduring challenges to American electoral integrity.





[i] R. Michael Alvarez, Lonna Rae Atkeson and Thad Hall. 2012. Evaluating Elections: A Handbook of Methods and Standards. New York: Cambridge University Press.
[ii] Richard L. Hasen, 2012. The Voting Wars: From Florida 2000 to the Next Election Meltdown. New Haven: Yale University Press.
[iii] Louis Massicotte, Andre Blais and Antoine Yoshinaka. 2004. Establishing the Rules of the Game. Toronto: University of Toronto Press; Alan Wall, et al. 2006. Electoral Management Design: The International IDEA Handbook. Sweden: International IDEA.
[iv] Electoral Assistance Commission  http://www.eac.gov/
[v] R. Michael Alvarez and Thad E. Hall. 2006. ‘Controlling democracy: the principal–agent problems in election administration.’ The Policy Studies Journal 34(4):  491-510; Thad E. Hall, J. Quin Monson and Kelly D. Patterson. 2009. ‘The human dimension of elections: How poll workers shape public confidence in elections.’ Political Research Quarterly 62(3):507-522.
[vi] See Chapter 2 in Brian L. Fife. 2010. Reforming the Electoral Process in America. Santa Barbara, CA: Praeger.
[viii] Pew Center on the States. 2012. Inaccurate, Costly, and Inefficient. http://www.pewstates.org/research/reports/inaccurate-costly-and-inefficient-85899378437
[ix] Michael P. McDonald. ‘2010 general election turnout rates’ available at http://elections.gmu.edu/Turnout_2010G.html.  See Table 2.6 in Brian L. Fife. 2010. Reforming the Electoral Process in America. Santa Barbara, CA: Praeger. For a discussion, see Michael P. McDonald and Samuel Popkin. 2001. ‘The Myth of the Vanishing Voter.’ American Political Science Review 95(4): 963-974. Higher estimates (5.3 million) are provided by the Sentencing Project http://www.sentencingproject.org/template/page.cfm?id=133;
[xi] Nate Silver. July 15 2012. ‘Measuring the effects of Voter Identification Laws.’ New York Times.
[xii] Delia Bailey. ‘Federal election fraud cases.’ In R. Michael Alvarez, Thad E. Hall and Susan Hyde. Eds. 2008. Election fraud: detecting and deterring electoral manipulation. Washington, DC: Brookings Institute. For an alternative view see, however, John H. Fund. 2004. Stealing Elections: How Voter Fraud Threatens Our Democracy. San Francisco, CA: Encounter Books.
[xiii] Lorraine Carol Minnite. 2010. The Myth of Voter Fraud. Ithaca: Cornell University Press.
[xiv] See Table 5.1 in Brian L. Fife. 2010. Reforming the Electoral Process in America. Santa Barbara, CA: Praeger.   
[xv] The Center for Responsive Politics. http://www.opensecrets.org/bigpicture/index.php  
[xvi] If the estimated total costs of the 2000 electoral cycle are calculated in constant prices, taking account of the cumulative rate of inflation (33.3%) from 2000-2012, the equivalent total cost of the 2012 electoral cycle would have been $4,109bn, not $6,285bn. http://www.usinflationcalculator.com/
[xvii] Robert G. Boatright. 2012. ‘The end of the reform era? Campaign finance retrenchment in the United States and Canada.’ The Forum 10(2): 1-30; Glenn Hubbard and Tim Kane. 2013. ‘In defense of Citizens United: Why campaign finance reform threatens American democracy.’ Foreign Affairs 92(4): 126-133.
[xviii] The Center for Responsive Politics. http://www.opensecrets.org/pres12/superpacs.php
[xix] For a discussion about the broader consequences for American politics, see Lawrence Lessig. 2011. Republic, Lost. New York: Twelve.
[xx] Steven J. Rosenstone, Roy L. Behr and Edward Lazarus. 1996. Third Parties in America: Citizen Response to Major Party Failure. 2nd ed. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press; Donald J. Green. 2010. Third Party Matters: Politics, Presidents and Third Parties in American History. New York: Praeger.
[xxi] David Butler and Bruce E. Cain. 1992. Congressional Redistricting: Comparative and Theoretical Perspectives. New York: Macmillan; Michael P. McDonald. 2008.  ‘United States redistricting.’ In Redistricting in Comparative Perspective Eds. Lisa Handley and Bernard Grofman. New York: Oxford University Press.
[xxii] The New York Times estimated that around 42 members of the House of Representatives were affiliated with the Tea Party Caucus, although another 38 members supported tying the budget to attempts to defund the Affordable Care Act. http://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2013/10/20/us/politics/the-factions-in-the-house.html?hp
[xxiii] Theda Skocpol and Vanessa Williamson.  2013. The Tea Party and the Remaking of Republican Conservatism. New York: Oxford University Press.
[xxiv] The US Presidential Commission on Electoral Administration. http://www.supportthevoter.gov/

Sunday, 2 March 2014

The depth of Ukrainian divisions between east and west?


By Pippa Norris

Current events escalating in Crimea clearly highlight the polarization among political leaders and activists in Ukraine. Developments reflect conflicting visions of the country’s diplomatic ties and regional identities, whether as part of the future European Union or else linked to Russia and the legacy Commonwealth of Independent States.

But how much do the recent events reflect cultural cleavages among ordinary people living in Ukrainian society?

Cross-national survey evidence to examine Ukrainian public opinion is available from the World Values Survey. This study, which now includes more than 90 countries, is a global investigation of socio-cultural and political change. The survey started with the first wave in 1981 and the 6th wave contains surveys from around 60 countries with data gathered from 2010-2014. The World Values Survey (WVS) is a non-profit, academic survey program representing the largest exploration into human values and cultural change around the world (for more details, see www.worldvaluessurvey.org).

In 2011, during the period when President Viktor Yanukovych was in power for the Party of Regions, the 6th wave study conducted a representative survey of 1,500 Ukrainians, almost equally divided by the language spoken at home into Russian and Ukrainian speakers.  For convenience these groups are labelled ‘Eastern’ and ‘Western’ Ukrainians. For comparison, the World Values Survey also conducted a similar survey of public opinion in the neighboring states of Poland (#966) in 2012 and Russia (#2,500) in 2011. The comparison allows us to see how far Eastern and Western Ukrainians share similar cultural values with each other on many issues, such as support for democracy or confidence in government, or whether they are closer to the values found in each neighboring state.

Attitudes towards democracy

First, do Ukrainians differ in their attitudes towards democracy? Are Western Ukrainians more enthusiastic for reforms strengthening political rights and civil liberties, while Eastern Ukrainians hanker for the strong state and stability of their authoritarian past?


One way to examine attitudes is through using a 0-10 point scale, where respondents were asked to assess the importance of living in a country which is democratic. Figure 1 illustrates the results showing that there are indeed some modest differences; Western Ukrainians rated the importance of democracy marginally higher than those living in the East. Western Ukrainians are therefore located a bit closer to political attitudes found in Poland, while Eastern Ukrainians express values which are slightly closer to Russian attitudes. But the gaps within Ukraine were extremely modest.

For another measure, people were also asked to use a similar 0-10 point scale to express their satisfaction with the performance of democracy in their own country. Here Ukrainians in both regions proved somewhat critical of how democracy worked in practice, fairly close to the opinions of most Russians, while by contrast Poles proved more satisfied with how democracy worked.

Another way that political attitudes and values can be measured concerns public reactions to statements describing several alternative forms of rule.  Respondents were asked in the survey whether they thought it was good or bad to have a strong leader ‘who does not have to bother with parliaments or elections’, a way of tapping into approval of authoritarian rule without mentioning the ‘d’ word.


Here it appears from Figure 2 that Ukrainians overwhelmingly agree with the desire for strong leadership – and in this both Eastern and Western regions are strikingly similar to Russians.  Almost three quarters of Ukrainians and Russians approve of the idea of strong political leadership, perhaps expressing frustration with the process and outcome of elections. By contrast, citizens in Poland display a stronger commitment to the principles and procedures of liberal democracy by clearly rejecting this form of rule.

Nevertheless public opinion is not wholly clear and consistent; when people were asked whether they approve of having a democratic political system, it appears that public opinion favors this form of government in all the societies under comparison. This pattern is also found elsewhere around the world, where the principles of democracy are widely endorsed, even among citizens living under one party states and authoritarian regimes.

Finally, what about trust and confidence in their government and parliament?  Here again there are some modest contrasts between Western and Eastern Ukrainians, following the expected direction. In 2011, those living in Eastern Ukraine expressed slightly more confidence and trust (+8% points) in the government of President Victor Yanukovych (Party of Regions) than those living in Western Ukraine. This reflects the map of votes cast in the January 17th 2010 presidential contest. On the other hand, only around one fifth of Ukrainians expressed ‘a great deal’ or ‘quite a lot of confidence’ in both their government and parliament, compared with far more Russian confidence in President Putin.


Conclusions

Overall what emerges are the striking cultural similarities rather than differences found in political values among the publics living in Eastern and Western Ukraine. On issues such as relatively strong endorsement of democratic values and ideals, and simultaneous lack of satisfaction with the way that democracy works, Ukrainians in both regions display the typical characteristics of ‘critical citizens’ found in many parts of the world (Norris 2011). Similarly the Ukrainians are not along in the tensions observed between seeking strong leaders and yet also approving of democracy. And the low confidence in core political institutions is also far from unique to this country.

Admittedly there are some small but important contrasts between Western and Eastern Ukrainians, notably in voting support for the Party of the Regions and in confidence in the government of President Yanukovych. Other explorations of the data suggest that indeed Eastern Ukrainians has more confidence in CIS than those living in the East. But the political attitudes which are shared among all Ukrainians are far more evident from this comparison than the values where regions differ. Not surprisingly, although language divides, there are many other aspects of Ukrainian culture and historical traditions which have been shared over the centuries. Even if the leaders and activists are sharply polarized, this evidence suggest that the cultural differences within Ukraine remain fairly modest.

Reference:
Norris, Pippa. 2011. Democratic Deficit: Critical Citizens Revisited New York: Cambridge University Press. 

Bio: Pippa Norris is Laureate Research Fellow and Professor of Government and International Relations, University of Sydney and  McGuire Lecturer in Comparative Politics, Harvard University.

3 March 2014

Tuesday, 25 February 2014


The risks of flawed and failed elections worldwide

In many countries, polling day ends with disputes about ballot-box fraud, corruption, and flawed registers. Which claims are accurate? And which are false complaints from sore losers?

New evidence gathered by the Electoral Integrity Project has just been released in an annual report which compares the risks of flawed and failed elections, and how far countries around the world meet international standards. The EIP is an independent research project based at the University of Sydney and Harvard University, under the direction of Professor Pippa Norris.

This annual report evaluates all national parliamentary and presidential contests occurring in 66 countries worldwide holding 73 election from 1 July 2012 to 31 December 2013 (excluding smaller states with a population below 100,000), from Albania to Zimbabwe. Data is derived from a global survey of 855 election experts. Immediately after each contest, the survey asks domestic and international experts to monitor the quality based on 49 indicators.  These responses are then clustered into eleven stages occurring during the electoral cycle and summed to construct an overall 100-point expert Perception of Electoral Integrity (PEI) index and ranking.

Several major new findings emerge from the EIP report.

  • Headlines often focus on problems occurring on polling day. Yet lack of a level playing field in political finance and campaign media were seen by experts as the most serious risk to integrity worldwide. These risks were found in many countries, with campaign finance the weakest part of the electoral cycle. 
  • Overall, not surprisingly, electoral integrity is strengthened by democracy and development. Longer experience over successive contests consolidates democratic institutions, deepens civic cultures, and builds the capacity of electoral management bodies. Nevertheless electoral integrity was particularly strong in several third wave democracies and emerging economies, including the Republic of Korea, the Czech Republic, Slovenia, Lithuania, Argentina, and Mongolia.
  • By contrast, experts were critical about flawed elections in several long-established democracies, such as Italy and Japan. Most strikingly, according to the PEI index, the United States ranked 26th out of 73 elections under comparison worldwide, the lowest score among Western nations. Experts highlighted concern over American practices of district boundaries, voter registration, and campaign finance.
  • Worldwide, South East Asia was the weakest region. This includes Malaysia, due to its district boundaries and electoral laws, and Cambodia, with concerns about voter registration, the compilation of results, and the independence of electoral authorities. Recent electoral protests and instability in Thailand, Cambodia, and Malaysia vividly illustrate these challenges. Eurasian elections also raise concern, such as those in Belarus, Tajikistan, Ukraine, Turkmenistan and Azerbaijan. Finally, several African states with restricted human rights and political freedoms were at risk of failed elections, including Equatorial Guinea, Djibouti, the Republic of Congo, Angola, and Zimbabwe. 
Subsequent annual reports will cover national elections every year, to broaden the comparison worldwide.

“The spread of elections worldwide during recent decades has been accompanied by widespread concern about their quality,” Pippa Norris commented, “Too often elections are deeply flawed, or even failing to meet international standards. This study is the first to gather reliable evidence from experts to pinpoint where contests are problematic- such as in Belarus, Djibouti, and Zimbabwe – and also to celebrate where they succeed, such as in Norway, the Czech Republic, Slovenia, and South Korea.”

Further information is available at www.electoralintegrityproject.com  

The Perceptions of Electoral Integrity (PEI) Index

Source: Electoral Integrity Project. 2014. The expert survey of Perceptions of Electoral Integrity, Release 2 (PEI_2)

Sunday, 2 February 2014

Derailed election in a divided Thailand

Voting was impossible in nine out of 77 provinces, and disrupted in nine others (including Bangkok). (Sources: The Nation and Greenlight Thailand)


After months of uncertainty, talks of delay, street protests and deadly violence (for background see previous blog post), Thailand's parliamentary snap election took place as scheduled on 2nd February 2014. The election was marred by a massive disruption campaign of the opposition People's Democratic Reform Committee (PDRC), a conglomerate of the urban Bangkok middle class and rural southern Thais under the leadership of former Democrat party MP Suthep Thaugsuban, who had vowed to bring prime minister Yingluck Shinawatra's 'parliamentary dictatorship' to its knees.

According to information released by the Election Commission of Thailand, 10.8% of polling stations nationwide (10,139 of a total of 93,952) were not operational on election day. In nine out of Thailand's 77 provinces no voting was possible at all. All of these provinces are located in the country's South, the traditional stronghold of the opposition Democrat party, which had announced their election boycott earlier. In nine other provinces - including Bangkok - voting was partially disrupted. 488 out of the capital's 6200 polling stations were not operational. In total, up to 12 million of Thailand's 48 million eligible voters were estimated to be disenfranchised by the PDRC's campaign. Contrary to this, the polls went ahead smoothly in the North and Northeast, where Yingluck's Phuea Thai party enjoys widespread support.

In addition to a prolonged 'Bangkok Shutdown' through street protests, a barrage of misogynist attacks on prime minister Yingluck, and a plethora of judicial maneuvers, the anti-government protesters used diverse tactics to disable the electoral process:

1) Candidate registration was made impossible or severely hindered in several southern provinces and partially in Bangkok in late December and early January. This was in some places accompanied by severe violence. Since candidates for more than 5% of the seats were thus missing, this led to a situation where the required quorum for convening parliament could not be reached, even if voting proceeded as normal in all other places. At least 28 out of 500 seats are missing due to this tactic, while 16 seats are uncertain because candidates stood unopposed and would have to secure at least 20% of the votes in these constituencies get into parliament.

2) Advanced voting on 26 January 2014 was hindered by voter intimidation, physically blocking access to polling places, and by the fact that election officials had previously resigned. The election commission acted indecisively on this issue. Instead of working with security forces to ensure that advanced voting proceeded as planned, the commission continuously made headlines by suggesting a postponement of the election. Northern and northeastern provinces were with a few exceptions unaffected by these events.
Despite an online and physical intimidation campaign, voters still attempted to cast their early ballots, defying anti-government protesters and in some cases violent threats (see two examples here and here). This created a wave of memes on social media that framed these voters as heroes for democracy, who reclaimed their citizen rights against angry mobs of PDRC protesters. Arguably, the opposition movement lost the battle for international public opinion through these images.
In several instances, the blockage of polling places led to violent clashes between anti- and pro-government groups. An opposition movement leader was shot dead on advance voting day. This was merely one of a series of incidents in the lead-up to the election, such as explosions at a protest site, or opposing groups exchanging gunfire in Bangkok, to name just a few.

Depiction of 'heroes of the election' (ฮีโร่เลือกตั้ง), rendered as a cartoon on the basis of youtube videos and photographs that quickly became iconic (see here, here and here). (Source: Facebook


3) On election day, numerous polling places were incapacitated as a result of missing ballot papers - because protesters had prevented their delivery or had in some instances destroyed them. Consequentially, voters willing to cast their ballot improvised election materials in some polling places. They staged their own version of an election with impromptu booths and ballot papers - a crime under Thai law that could result in up to ten years imprisonment.
Other polling stations did not open due to the fact that no candidates at all were standing (see above), while still others were physically surrounded by anti-government protesters. Voters showing their ID cards as a symbol of their willingness to vote attempted to gain access to polling places and were in many cases hindered. Security forces prevented clashes between opposing groups in several locations.
Subsequently, angered voters flocked to police stations and filed complaints, lawsuits against the Election Commission and/or the PDRC, and attempted to fill out the necessary papers that would allow them to participate in by-elections.

---

The Election Commission has not released election results and plans to organize a re-run of advance voting on 23 February 2014. In addition, numerous by-elections will have to be organized for those constituencies that remained closed on election day. It will undoubtedly take time to sort out the administrative and legal challenges, given that the opposition is expected to call for an annulment of the election. The bigger riddle is how to evaluate the legitimacy of any incoming government, given the lower turnout, possible high percentage of 'No' votes, and the fact that the main opposition party boycotted the election. 

The violent incidents in the run-up to the election (at least ten fatalities and more than 500 injured) are a display of the deep rifts that separate Thailand along class, geographic, ethno/linguistic and ideological lines. It will certainly take more than elections to mend those rifts, or at least come to a minimum agreement on rules of the game. At the present moment, parts of the middle classes and parts of southern Thailand's rural population reject elections as a legitimate process for leadership selection. They insist on making anti-corruption reforms the priority and fiercely cling to the view that the majority of Thais (who support the current government) are easily duped by vote-buying or 'populist' policies. Although turnout for protests in Bangkok will now decrease in the short run, mobilization against elections and against the government is quite likely to happen again and again, until the grievances of these disenchanted minorities are taken seriously and they in turn re-enter electoral politics. Meanwhile, voters wonder why they are being deprived of their citizen rights and why an opposition that uses primarily extra-constitutional means should be taken seriously in the first place. In absence of a new social contract, some already contemplate a split of the country.



Max Grömping
Sydney, 3 February 2014

Max Grömping is a researcher for the Electoral Integrity Project at the University of Sydney. His current research focuses on the role of social media and domestic observers on electoral integrity. Prior to this, he lectured at Thammasat University, Thailand. 








Monday, 30 December 2013

Thailand’s opposition rejects elections


Anti-government protesters at Bangkok’s Victory Monument (Source: Prachatai)



Max Grömping

Bangkok
30 December 2013


A wave of recent protests has brought a backlash of the elites against popularly elected (and perhaps populist) governments around the world, as shown from Egypt and Turkey to the Ukraine and Thailand. Driven by typical middle class angst of the numerical superiority of “uneducated” masses, these protests sometimes have elements of a democratic rollback.

Thailand exemplifies a country roiled by mass protests against elections.  Demonstrations in Bangkok have drawn increasing numbers onto the street during recent months.  In mid-October 2013, the government led by Prime Minister Yingluck Shinawatra hastily rammed an amnesty bill through the lower house of parliament. This would have absolved corruption charges against the former prime minister, Thaksin Shinawatra, Yingluck's brother. The government quickly backed down in the face of protest and the amnesty bill was subsequently killed by the Senate. Nevertheless the protests were transformed into a wholesale condemnation of the government, with the goal of completely uprooting the “Thaksin regime”. Protesters forced the capital to a virtual standstill on 22 December 2013, with hundreds of thousands of demonstrators convening around the city.

The current wave of protest is the latest installment of the ongoing struggle between Thailand's yellow and red political camps. Anti-government and pro-government forces face each other across this color-coded divide of regional, ideological and class differences (see this article by Pasuk Phongpaichit and Chris Baker, and a recent survey conducted by the Asia Foundation).  

The anti-government forces  

The anti-government demonstrators are a reincarnation of the yellow-shirted movement that first brought Thaksin's government to its knees by sustained urban protests and a military coup d’état in 2006. Although currently an alliance of diverse groups, the backbone of the yellow movement rests on the Bangkok middle class and Thais from the upper southern provinces. The capital’s middle classes, who have dominated Thai politics since the 1960s and prospered disproportionately from the country’s economic success, feel threatened by the growing aspirations of rural citizens and urban poor, who have turned out in mass at the polls to support Thaksin’s popular policies - such as universal healthcare, micro loans, or guaranteed rice prices. The middle classes have nothing but disdain for their rural compatriots of the upper North and Northeast, whose cultural and linguistic roots are predominately Lao and Lanna, while many Bangkokians view themselves as the true holders of “Thainess”.

The South on the other hand is the traditional stronghold of the opposition Democrat party, who first reluctantly joined the protests but has now been completely absorbed by them. When all Democrat MPs resigned from parliament on 8 December 2013 to join the protests, Yingluck was quick to dissolve parliament and call a snap election for 2 February 2014.

This was the sensible move for Yingluck. Her governing Phuea Thai party won the latest 2011 election in a landslide. Previous Thaksinite parties have dominated the electoral arena since 2001. The mass resignation of Democrat MPs seemed counterproductive, given that the party had failed to succeed at any election since the 1990s. But their goal was not a new election but rather the transfer of legislative powers to an unelected “People’s Council”, to be comprised of members of occupational associations, academics, and “respected figures from society”. This proposal drew severe criticism from academic circles but it resonates well with the demonstrators and some strata of Thai society. The protesters reject the upcoming election and want it postponed for 18 months, while the electoral system is reformed and corruption rooted out under the auspices of the “People’s Council” as caretaker government.

Resigned-Democrat MP Suthep Thaugsuban has become the unlikely leader of this protest movement. His anti-corruption rhetoric and talk of replacing degenerated politicians with “good people” resonates well with many followers, who have deeply rooted beliefs in virtuous leadership, going all the way back to notions of what Thongchai Winichakul terms “royalist democracy”. There is a certain irony in the fact that a former southern “provincial godfather”, a machine politician with his own impressive track record of corruption charges, is the figure that middle classes coalesce around.

Thai prime minister Yingluck Sinawatra (left) and protest leader Suthep Thaugsuban (Source: commons.wikimedia.org)


The pro-government forces

They are pitted against the red-shirted movement, a coalition of groups broadly in support of the ousted prime minister (in self-imposed exile since 2008) and his proxy parties.  On this side of the political divide, one can find an array of groups that date back to the military coup of 2006 (see Nick Nostitz’ “Red vs. Yellow” Part 1 and Part 2). First formed in defense of Thaksin’s government and solidifying around their rejection of the coup, the red shirts have since evolved into a considerable mass movement, with their stronghold in the Northern and Northeastern parts of the country. Broadly aligned with the Phuea Thai party and previous Thaksin proxy parties, there are nevertheless groups within the movement that do not unequivocally support the ex-premier. A subsection of red shirts turned out to protests against the amnesty bill in October 2013. In addition to absolving Thaksin, it would have also granted immunity to the perpetrators of the 2010 military crackdown on redshirt protesters in Bangkok, which left more than 90 people dead.

Yet, progressive elements within the red shirts that demand an end to impunity and actually rejected the amnesty bill are a clear minority. The majority, under the leadership of the United Front for Democracy against Dictatorship (UDD), promptly converged on Bangkok in October 2013 to support Yingluck’s government and staged their own counter-rally in reaction to Suthep’s demonstrations. The location of this counter-rally – Rajamangala stadium in eastern Bangkok – was the site of the first bloodshed of this round of protests, when local anti-government protesters and students clashed with the pro-government redshirts gathering in the stadium. Five people remained dead in the street.

The protests escalated further when the anti-government demonstrators occupied several ministries and forced TV stations to air Suthep’s speeches in November 2013. Yingluck’s government showed restraint and even yielded ministry grounds to the protesters for some time. This incapacitated parts of the administration and has been called a “people’s coup”. Through all this, the military and the courts refused to intervene on behalf of the yellow side (as they had done several times before). Previous experiences had shown that a violent counter-backlash from the red shirts would ensue.


Chaotic scenes as anti-government protesters storm the site of party-list candidate registration in Bangkok on 26 December 2013 (Source: Phuket Gazette)


To elect or not to elect?

The core of the conflict now rotates around the issue of the election, scheduled for 2 February 2014.  The red side supports the polls – partly out of their principled faith in the electoral process, and in parts due to the fact that they know they will win.   Yet the anti-government side (including the Democrat party) is firmly aligned against it. Suthep’s protesters demand the immediate resignation of Yingluck and the transfer of power to the above-mentioned “People’s Council”. They consequently sabotage the preparations for the election by blocking venues for candidate registration in Bangkok and several southern provinces. Clashes with the police who tried to protect the registration venues have led to further loss of life, with at least one police officer and one protester dead.

The Democrat party decided to boycott the election and will not field any candidates at all. They claim practices of widespread vote-buying, candidate-buying and the overall moral corruption of elected politicians. They hold that the principle of “one person, one vote” is not appropriate for Thailand, given the impact of money politics and a lack of education. By the latter, they tellingly mean the supposedly uneducated rural supporters of Thaksin and Yingluck.

But this logic is based on a counter-factual argument, because observers have deemed recent elections in Thailand to be comparatively free and fair, and the impact of vote-buying has diminished since the 1990s. While monetary gifts to voters are still the norm for all political parties in Thailand, their impact on voters’ actual choices is disputed. This skewed view of electoral malpractices is well in line with recent research that suggests that those affiliated with the losing side are much more likely to perceive flaws in elections.

In addition, the protesters’ discourse has turned to “populism” and “policy corruption” as useful memes. Thaksin’s and Yingluck’s popular policies have mobilized the rural voters, who now see that their vote can make a clear difference. The middle classes see their political dominance threatened by the numerical strength of these Northern and Northeastern voters, supposedly “bought” by particularistic election promises. The Democrat party has unsuccessfully tried to counter this appeal by launching very similar policy platforms in the 2011 election. Yet, they have failed to bridge the gap to Thaksin’s supporters, given the growing chasm of identity politics. This also highlights the failure of Thailand’s party system to implement any kind of internal party democracy. Most parties have not become vehicles for citizens to voice their grievances within an electoral framework. As a consequence, the Democrats boycott the upcoming election, meaning that Thailand’s oldest party and only viable opposition force has completely relinquished the electoral arena in favor of street politics.

Finally, the protesters voice legitimate grievances over endemic corruption and a lack of checks and balances in what they call the “Thaksin regime” or “electocracy”. Knowing that they cannot win at the polls, the focus has shifted to calls for institutions of horizontal accountability to keep the legislature in check and to protect minority interests. These usually consist of independent courts, anti-corruption commissions or ombudsmen, and in the Thai case, the Senate. Unfortunately, most of these institutions have become thoroughly politicized in Thailand and lack the ethos of impartiality, or the loyalty to the constitution which is arguably required of such bodies. One reason for this might be found in the fact that Thailand has had 17 constitutions since the end of the absolute monarchy in 1932. This is derided in a common joke that claims that the text of the constitutions can be found in the “periodicals” section of any library. While these grievances may be substantively legitimate, the talk of a “parliamentary dictatorship” that follows them obscures the fact that most of these institutional checks and balances are already politically tilted in favor of the yellow shirt camp.



Cover of Matichon Weekly newspaper (edition of 27 Dec. 2013 – 2 Jan. 2014) and billboard in Bangkok asking whether “Thaug chooses, or election chooses?”, referring to Suthep Thaugsuban’s nickname (Source: http://picpost.postjung.com/254613.html)


Elections exacerbating the conflict?

 In Thailand, this dissent is squarely aimed at electoral democracy as a political process. The disparate discourses of both sides, each caught in their own partisan media bubble, have led to a divisive climate in which elections are unlikely to produce a government whose legitimacy is accepted by all stakeholders. Some even voice concerns that the continued divisiveness and lack of a common ground might lead into further violence, and that even a civil war is no longer unthinkable. An ominous “third hand”, commonly referred to in Thai street politics, is blamed for attacking protest guards at night, possibly trying to provoke the military to step in to “restore order”.

The opposition movement vows to shut down candidate registration and to sabotage the election in every way possible. If they manage to do so in a sufficient number of constituencies to prevent 5% of seats being filled, parliament could not convene. This might finalize the crisis of state and bring about the military intervention that the protesters possibly hope for. Meanwhile, the red side pledges support for the electoral process and threatens collective action in support of the government. The Election Commission of Thailand (ECT) appears unwilling or unable to take a decisive stance to fulfill its mandate and go ahead with the election. Regional election officials in the South are already resigning in frustration over the ongoing hindrances, or perhaps in a move to derail the election themselves. So it seems indeed plausible that the polls might worsen the political conflict. Instead of channeling political forces into a peaceful electoral contest for national power, they instead provide the fuse that might ignite the powder-keg that is Thailand. If they go ahead, the yellow side will reject the results, if they are cancelled, the red side will be infuriated.

An impartial and professional assessment of the quality of the election is thus needed more than ever. Yet there is a void of high-quality domestic election observers in Thailand, unlike in neighboring Cambodia or Malaysia, where civil society has built strong capacities to keep an eye on the electoral process. The only domestic Thai watchdog, the NGO Poll Watch Foundation, has shrunk to near insignificance following the 2011 election. Compared with large domestic observation efforts in neighboring countries, Poll Watch’s observation team of only 700 seemed ill-suited to provide extensive coverage. Interestingly, the organizations former chairperson, Somchai Srisuthiyakorn, is now one of Thailand's five election commissioners, calling for a postponement of the election. Meanwhile, the only other source of independent observation, the regional monitoring network ANFREL, struggles with constraints of manpower and funding, leaving only partisan observers to keep watch.

Even if such an independent assessment could be provided, perhaps by involving ordinary citizens in crowd-sourced monitoring of the polls, it is unlikely to convince the current protesters of the legitimacy of the election. The ongoing political conflict requires first a broad alliance for what some call a new social contract, a negotiated settlement on broadly accepted rules of the game. But absent this, the election is likely to inflame the political division of the country and lead to further violence.


Max Grömping
Bangkok, 30 December 2013

Max Grömping is a researcher for the Electoral Integrity Project at the University of Sydney. His current research focuses on the role of social media and domestic observers on electoral integrity. Prior to this, he lectured at Thammasat University, Thailand. 
Contact: max.groemping[at]sydney.edu.au