Monday, 14 March 2016

Donald Trump as an authoritarian populist

Pippa Norris
Harvard and Sydney Universities
This blog first appeared on 11 March 2016 in the Washington Post/Monkey Cage.

Many American commentators have had trouble understanding the rise of Donald Trump. How could such a figure surge to become the most likely standard-bearer for the GOP – much less have any chance of entering the White House?

But Trump is far from unique. As many commentators have noted, he fits the wave of authoritarian populists whose support has swelled in many Western democracies.

The graph below from ParlGov data illustrates the surge in the share of the vote for populist authoritarian parliamentary parties (defined as rated 8.0 or above by experts on left-right scales) since 20?? across 34 OECD countries.

Votes for populist authoritarian parties in post-industrial societies

Source: ParlGov ‘Elections’

There's been a wave of populist figures throughout the west over the past two decades

Contemporary authoritarian populism is nothing new. On 21st April 2002, Jean-Marie Le Pen defeated France’s socialist Prime Minister Lionel Jospin in the first round of the French presidential elections. That shocked Europe. One of the best-known radical right leaders, Le Pen dismissed the holocaust as a ”detail of history.” All over France, millions of people protested at massive anti-Front National demonstrations. 
Less than three weeks later, on 6th May 2002, Netherland’s flamboyant and controversial Pim Fortuyn was assassinated for his anti-immigrant and anti-Muslim views, leading to a sudden surge of support for his party in the general election. The anti-immigrant Lijst Pim Fortuyn, formed just three months before the election, suddenly became the second largest party in the Dutch parliament and part of the governing coalition.
Nor are these isolated successes. During the last two decades, parties led by populist authoritarian leaders have surged in popularity in many nations, gaining legislative seats, reaching ministerial office, and holding government power.

Recently we’ve seen notable gains for the Swiss People’s Party, the Austrian Freedom Party, the Swedish Democrats, and the Danish People’s Party. Both the center-left and center-right are concerned about the current popularity of Marine Le Pen’s Front Nationale, Matteo Salvini’s Northern League, and Geert Wilders’s Party for Freedom. In Hungary, the success of the neo-fascist Jobbik party pushed the ruling Fidesz party even further to the right; Hungary’s government is now building a wall against the waves of migrants flooding across Europe.

It’s not just Europe, either. Latin America has its radical populism with charismatic leaders like Hugo Chavez in Venezuela and Evo Morales in Bolivia. Some populist leaders and parties rise temporarily in opinion polls then plummet equally rapidly. In Britain, for example, the UK Independence Party won only a single seat in the May 2015 general election. But even flash parties can infect the political culture and mainstream parties; the UKIP fuelled more rabid anti-European sentiments, and was one of the reasons Conservatives called the EU Brexit referendum.

These parties steal votes mainly from the center right. Populist appeals also draw support from certain characteristics associated with the center-left, especially by appealing predominately to men, the less educated, and the economically marginalized.

Why is angry populism on the rise?
The standard economic account explains populism as arising when growing inequality and social exclusion mobilize the dispossessed. But populist authoritarian leaders have arisen in several affluent post-industrial ”knowledge” societies, in cradle-to-grave welfare states with some of the best-educated and most secure populations in the world, like Sweden and Denmark -- where you'd expect social tolerance and liberal attitudes instead of xenophobic appeals.

Some observers have offered U.S.-based explanations for Trump in particular, arguing that his popularity is a reaction to the election (and reelection) of the first African-American president to the White House; a backlash against Obama’ policies and style; public anger against fat cats in elections, or the Tea Party tilt pushing House Republicans to the right. But populists have gained in many modern democraciesstates without any of this.

These authoritarian populists have been with us now for twenty years, in economically bad times as well as good, in both predominately Catholic and Protestant societies, in Nordic and Mediterranean regions, in liberal Norway and conservative Switzerland, in egalitarian welfare states as well as unequal societies, in the European Union and in several Anglo-American democracies like New Zealand, Canada, and Australia. Why?

We’re seeing a deep and strong a cultural backlash against changes in social values
Here’s why. Populist authoritarianism can best be explained as a cultural backlash in Western societies against long-term, on-going social change.

Over recent decades, the World Values Survey shows that Western societies have been getting gradually more liberal on many social issues, especially among the younger generation and well-educated middle class. That includes egalitarian attitudes towards sex roles, tolerance of fluid gender identities and LGBT rights, support for same-sex marriage, tolerance of diversity, more secular values, emancipative values[EG2] , engagement in direct forms of democratic participation[EJG3] , and cosmopolitan support for agencies of global governance.

This long-term generational shift threatens many traditionalists’ cultural values. Less educated and older citizens fear becoming marginalized and left behind within their own countries.

In the U.S., evidence from the World Values Survey perfectly illustrates the education gap in these types of cultural values. Well before Trump, a substantial and striking education gap can be observed in American approval of authoritarian leaders. The WVS asked whether Americans approved of ”having a strong leader who doesn’t have to bother with congress or elections.“ The figure below shows a consistent education gap and growing support for this statement since 2005. Most remarkably, by the most recent wave in 2011, almost half -- 44 percent -- of U.S. non-college graduates of having a strong leader unchecked by elections and Congress.

The substantial education gap in American approval of authoritarian leadership, 2011

Note: Q: “I'm going to describe various types of political systems and ask what you think about each as a way of governing this country. For each one, would you say it is a very good, fairly good, fairly bad or very bad way of governing this country? Having a strong leader who does not have to bother with congress and elections.” Proportion of Americans agreeing with either ‘Very/fairly bad or ‘very/fairly good’.
Source: World Values Survey, 6th wave (2011)

This deeply disturbing finding reflects attitudes usually observed in states such as Russia.

Moreover, this is not an isolated finding or quirk of fieldwork. If we look at a couple of the classic measures of tolerance towards sexual liberalization and value change – including towards homosexuality and abortion – the two figures below illustrate the size of the education gap on these issues.

Finding a gap is hardly headline news in the research literature. But the education gap appears to widen slightly over time. That suggests that U.S. differences in cultural values and social tolerance by class have expanded rather than shrunk.

The growing education gap in American tolerance of homosexuality

Note: Q “Please tell me for each of the following actions whether you think it can always be justified, never be justified, or something in between, using this card from 1 (never) to 10 (always)….”
Source: World Values Survey

The growing education gap in American tolerance of abortion

Note: Q “Please tell me for each of the following actions whether you think it can always be justified, never be justified, or something in between, using this card from 1 (never) to 10 (always)….”
Source: World Values Survey

The Republican Party has prepared the way for an authoritarian movement
By giving voice and amplifying fears of cultural change, the Republicans have opened the way for a populist leader. Trump’s support appears to be fuelled by a backlash among traditionalists (often men and the less educated) faced with rising American support for issues such as gay marriage, sexual equality, and tolerance of social diversity, all lumped under the phrase ”political correctness.”Looking back, we can see precursors to the Trump movement, like  the Tea Party.

Assessing the damage done

Whether or not Trump is elected, he and his followers have articulated a new brutalism and intolerance, insert those into what’s speakable in American politics.

While the Trump phenomenon mirrors what’s happened elsewhere, most Western parliamentary democracies have many safeguards in place, so that even when populist authoritarian parties surge, they remain limited in seats and thus real power.

Tuesday, 8 March 2016

Flawed and Failed elections in 2015

Pippa Norris
Harvard and Sydney Universities

At a time of growing gloom about prospects for democratization around the world, many still hope that elections will provide opportunities for gains. Contests in countries such as Myanmar, Nigeria and Benin provide hope, in different ways, for progress.
The good news is that direct elections are used today as the pathway to elected office in the lower house of parliament in 95% of all sovereign nation-states around the world (185 out of 193 states).[1] During the late twentieth-century, popular contests have also proliferated for presidential, provincial, municipal and local office. This potentially strengthens the voice of the people and the accountability of their leaders.
But the bad news is that major challenges remain to strengthen electoral legitimacy and the quality of free and fair contests in all countries. Too often, multiple serious technical flaws and violations of political rights are reported. Laws ban opposition parties. Rival leaders are imprisoned. Voting rights are suppressed. Electoral registers are inaccurate. Ruling parties dominate the airwaves. Free speech is muzzled. Thugs threaten voters. Campaigns are awash with money. Ballot-stuffing fakes the count. Electoral officials favor the government. Dispute resolution mechanisms are broken. Rigged elections can reinforce the legitimacy of corrupt and repressive leaders, solidifying their hold on power.
Electoral malpractices also matter by deepening public mistrust of electoral authorities, political parties and parliaments, which, in turn, affects citizen behavior by depressing voter turnout and catalyzing protest activism.[2] Since elections are the heart of the representative process, flawed contests damage party competition, democratic governance, and fundamental human rights.[3]

But how common are these types of problems? Where do they arise around the world?
New evidence to give insights into this issue has been gathered by the Electoral Integrity Project. The 2015 annual report compares the risks of flawed and failed elections, and how far countries around the world meet international standards. The report gather assessments from over 2000 experts to evaluate the integrity of all 180 national parliamentary and presidential contests held between 1 July 2012 to 31 December 2015 in 139 countries worldwide, including 54 national elections held last year.
To summarize the evidence, Figure 1 illustrates the contrasts in the overall 100-point PEI index for all the countries covered in the survey since 2012, divided by global region. The ranking and map offer a worldwide overview.
The comparisons highlight that Scandinavia and Western Europe are rated most highly in overall levels of electoral integrity, not surprisingly given the long history of democracy in the region. The rankings in PEI worldwide are led by Scandinavian states -- Denmark, Finland, Norway and Sweden –which also do well in most standard indices of the quality of democratic governance. At the same time, however, contrasts are observed in PEI-4.0 scores even among similar European Union member states and post-industrial societies; Mediterranean Europe usually performs less well than Northern Europe. The UK also scores exceptionally poorly compared with other European societies, with a PEI Index around 20 points less than the top ranking Scandinavian states.
In the Americas, even wider disparities can be seen, contrasting the cases of Costa Rica, Uruguay and Canada, all well rated by experts, compared with the low ratings for Guatemala, Venezuela, Honduras and particularly Haiti. Overall the United States ranks 47 worldwide out of all 139 nations under comparison, based on the 2012 presidential and 2014 Congressional elections, even before the bitterly divided 2016 campaign, the lowest score for any long-established democracy.

In post-Communist Europe, the power-sharing democracies, smaller welfare states, and mid-level income economies in the Baltics and Central Europe often do well in the quality of their elections today, including Estonia, Lithuania, and Slovenia, all scoring higher in the PEI Index than long-established majoritarian democracies such as India, the US, and UK. At the same time, Central Eurasia remains the home of several unreconstructed authoritarian states, which hold multi-party elections to legitimate ruling parties but with limited human rights, exemplified by the poor PEI scores observed in Azerbaijan, Tajikistan and Belarus.

Asia-Pacific sees similar wide disparities, with the affluent post-industrial societies of Australia, South Korea, New Zealand and Japan heading the ratings, as well as Mongolia, which has made rapid progress in abandoning its Soviet past. Yet other countries in the region perform far worse in the PEI Index, notably Cambodia, Malaysia and Bangladesh.
In the Middle East, Israel and Tunisia are the states holding elections with the highest integrity, according to the experts, whilst Bahrain, Afghanistan and Syria rated as having poor elections.
Finally, Sub-Saharan Africa sees positive scores for electoral integrity in Benin, Mauritius, Lesotho and South Africa, while unfortunately more than half the states included in the survey have low scores for integrity, with Burundi, Equatorial Guinea, and Ethiopia rated at the bottom of the sub-continent – and some of the lowest ratings around the globe.

What explains the ratings?

Research suggests that there is no single factor that can explain why countries perform well or badly when it comes to electoral integrity.[4] Instead the drivers lie in a combination of three types of conditions:

  •        Structural constraints; electoral integrity is more challenging in societies with widespread poverty and illiteracy (such as Afghanistan), a legacy of deep-rooted conflict (like Burundi), battling the ‘curse’ of natural resources and state capture (like Equatorial Guinea), and the confronted with a historical legacy inherited from previous regimes and elections within each country;
  •       International linkage; the quality of elections is also shaped by how far societies are open to the spread of international norms and standards through cosmopolitan communications and membership of regional organizations (such as within the OAS and OSCE), the positive or negative impact of neighboring regional powers, such as South Africa and Russia, and through the provision of international development aid and technical assistance; and,
  •      Institutional arrangements; electoral integrity also rests upon the power-sharing design of constitutional arrangements, electoral systems, and procedures, providing transparent, fair, inclusive and legitimate rules, as well as the powers, capacity, and ethos of the electoral authorities when managing elections.
Rather than abandoning support for elections, the international community needs to double down on its investment. Roughly half a million US dollars of ODA are spent annually on providing electoral assistance. While many elections are indeed deeply flawed today, the international community needs to work more effectively if there is to be any hope of further progress in human rights and democracy.

[1] Independent nation-states without de jure direct elections for the lower or single house of the national parliament specified in the constitution include Saudi Arabia, Brunei Darussalam, UAE, Qatar, and China. In addition, South Sudan, Eritrea and Somalia lack de facto direct elections for parliament, due to transitional constitutions. Direct elections have also been temporarily suspended in Thailand.
[2] Pippa Norris. 2014. Why Electoral Integrity Matters. New York: Cambridge University Press.
[3] Thomas Edward Flores and Irfan Nooruddin. 2016. Elections in Hard Times: Building Stronger Democracies in the 21st Century. New York: Cambridge University Press.
[4] Pippa Norris. 2015. Why Elections Fail. NY: Cambridge University Press.